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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT B. SWANER,

Respondent,
vs.

UNION MORTGAGE COMPANY, a corporation,
A. ppella;nt.

No. 6234

Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court of the
State of Utah in and for Salt Lake City, Utah, Before
Hon. Herbert M. Schiller.

RESPOIN DENT' s BRIEF
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IN THE

SUPREME CiOURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT B. SWANER,

Respondent,
vs.
UNION MORTGAGE· COMPANY, a corporation,
Appellant.

No.~6234

RESPO·NDENT' S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF' THE CASE
This action was brought by respondent, Robert B.
Swaner, against appellant, Union Mortgage Company,
to compel the cancellation of respondent's promissory.
note in favor of appellant for th·e sum of $3000; and a
mortgage .securing said note which covers certain real
1
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estate in Salt Lake County, Utah, and to recover damages under Section 78-3-8 Revised Statutes of Utah 1933.
On or about the first day of November, 1938, respondent applied to appellant for a loan of $3000, for the purpose of constructing a residence on the property in plaintiff's complaint described, located on Sixteenth East
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. Appellant agreed to make
said loan provided it could secure a commitment for insurance of the same under the regulations of Federal
Housing Administration, and said commitment was obtained November 6, 1938 (Exhibit 6), provided respondent's father and mother would sign the paper.s. (Ab. 3031, Tr. 105.)
It is admitted by the pleadings that the note and
mortgage were executed and delivered to appellant on or
about November 14, 1938~ and that on or about said date
said mortgage was recorded in the office of the County
Recorder ·of Salt Lake County. (Ab. 2, 6; Tr. 19, 30.)
At the time the note and mortgage were executed it was
agreed that 10% of said loan would be advanced when the
foundation was completed and the floor joists set, and the
work had received F.H.A. inspection; 15% when the roof
was on; 20% when the house was ready for plastering;
25% when the house was ready to be decorated; and 30%
when the structure was co~pleted and had been approved,
by F.H.A: (Exhibit A.) (Ah. 28, Tr. 85.)
Respondent proceeded with the work of construction
and after the founda:tion had been comp~leted an.d the
floor joists set the F.H.A. made its first inspection, approved the work (Ab. 28, 32; Tr. 179), and left on the

2
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premises its ''Memorandum of Compliance Inspection,''
under date of December ~1, 1938, certifying that "the
work then completed has passed the first inspection.''
(Exhibit 3.)
After the inspection respondent made repeated demands for the 10%, but appellant made excuses for nonpayment, first, that there was something wrong with the
cement, and later that they had not received the Inspection Report from F.H.A. (Tr. 113-114.) Respondent then
went to F.H.A. and was informed that the report had
been mailed to appellant. Respondent again went to appellant and a Mr. Chambers, to his apparent surp.rise
(Tr. 120) finally found the report (Exhibit 1) in the file,
and stated that he would take it up with Mr. Billings, the
manager of appellant company. The following d~y when
respondent called again to see about the 10%, he was informed that app.ellant would not pay the money until
respondent had complied with certain conditions respecting an entirely different loan covering property on Tenth
Avenue. (Ab. 32-33; Tr.l16-120.)
Respondent was obliged to cease work on the building
because of his inability to pay for materials and labor
(.Ab. 28-29; Tr. 94-98); and it has at all times since remained in its unfinished condition, as shown by Exhibits
Band C.
Upon refusal of appellant to advance any money on
the loan, as it agreed to do, respondent made written demand on appellant (Exhibit D) for the cancellation and
return of his note and the release of said mortgage, which
appellant refused to do unless r_espondent would pay
3
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appellant $114.10, alleged costs of procuring the F.H.A.
commitment for the insurance of said loan. Thereupon
respondent filed this action. The jury rendered an advisory verdict and the court, adopting said verdict, made
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, directing the release and cancellation of the note and mortgage and awarding respondent damages in the sum of
$225, and his costs. (Tr. 57-58, 68-69.) This appeal is
from said judgment.

ARGUMENT
It manifestly appears from the evidence that appellant violated its agreement to advance the money it agreed
to loan respondent.
On this appeal the technical defense is raised that
there was no F.H.A. approval of the work so as to entitle respondent to the 10% payment which became due
when the foundation was completed and the floor joists
set. There is no merit to this contention, for the evidence
is clearly to the contrary.
Swaner testified on direct examination:
"Q. Now you testified, Mr. Swaner, when the
floor of this building was constructed and the joists
were constructed, I think they are, they were to have
an F .H.A. inspection~
A. Yes.
Q,. Did it have an F.H.A. inspection?
A. Yes.
Q. Was that inspection approved by F.H.A. ~
A. Yes, it was passed by F.H.A. at that time.''
(Ab. 28, Tr. 91-92.)
4
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On re-direct examination he testified:

'' Q. Mr. g,yaner, I think you testified on crossexamination that the house had received its first
F.H.A. inspection~
A. That is right.
Q. No,v, after that time, and that was after the
floor had been completed an·d joists setA. Yes.
Q. No,v, after that time, did you at any time subsequent to that, have a conversation with defendant
mortgage c-ompany, or its officers, with respect to
the advancement of the ten per cent of the original
loan¥
A. Yes.
Q. With whom did you have that conversation~
A. Mr. Frank Conners~
Q. And about when did you have it-that is, approximately, to the best of your recollection"~
A. W~ll, approximately the first of December.
Q. About how long after the F.H.A. inspection
had been made¥
A. Immediately after the F.H.A. inspection,
the day after or so, I started to ask for the ten per
cent.
Q. What was the conversation~
A. I told them that it had passed the F.H.A.
inspection and I wanted my ten per cent. They said
to begin with that there was something wrong with
the cement in the foundation, and after that they
said they had received no notice from F .H ...~..t\..
Q. What was done with reference ·to the cement after you had had this conversation~
A. I called up my cement contractor and told
him that.
•

5
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Q. State what was done~
A. It was taken care of.
Q. What do you mean taken care of~
A. As I remember they were afraid the cement
was freezing and they wanted to wait and see.
MR. SHIELDS: Now if the court pleaseA. They-meaning F.H.A.
Q. Did the F.H.A. afterwards inspect the cement~

A.

Yes.

Q. Now Mr. Swaner, what did the F.H.A. finally
do with reference to the cement and flooring~
A. The cement and floors~
Q. Joists, or whatever it was~
A. Why, they were passed." (Tr. 113-116.)
A. J. Dean, a witness for plaintiff, testified:

'' Q. Do you know whether or not this structure
was inspected by the F.H.A. ~ ·
A. I know that it was.
Q. How do you know that~
A. Because when I came there on the job there
was a ticket fastened to one of the wires on the forms,
which it said on it-,Vell, it was an F·.H.A. approval
slip of the forms there." (T.r. 143, Ab. 36.)
Mr. Anderson, Chief Architect for F.H.A., testified
that Exhibit 3 is a copy of the document found in his file,
which in the course of business of F.H.A. inspection is
left upon the structure, and that at the date the slip bears
an inspection was made, and that Exhibit 3 is the only
slip or document which is delivered to the property owner

6

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

or left on the plaee, and that said exhibit is a copy of the
inspection slip left on the respondent's premises. (Ab.
42, Tr. 172-173.)
We respectfully submit that there is no conflict in
the evidence that there \Yas an approval by F.H.A. Ex . .
hibit 1, which was the ''Compliance Inspection Report,''
mailed to appellant, shows nothing to the contrary. It
contains nothing by way of exception to the unconditional approval shown by Exhibit 3. The statement: ''Concrete to be checked for freezing after it has had more time
to set up,'' appearing on Exhibit 1, is not an objection to
the concrete work, and there is not a scintilla of evidence
in the record that the concrete work was defective in any
way, and as appears from the testimony of Mr. Swaner,
after some fear was expressed that the cement might
freeze, it was afterwards passed. (Tr. 113-116.)
As a matter of fact appellant raised the question of
the sufficiency or validity of the inspection and approval
at the trial purely as an afterthought. That never was
really the ground upon which it refused to advance the
10%. The real reason is .set forth in paragraphs 2, 3, 4,
5 and 6 of defendant's answer and counter-claim to plaintiff's amended comp1aint (Tr. 30-33), which defense was
stricken as irrelevant and redundant upon motion of the
plaintiff. (Tr. 47.) The allegations in these paragraphs
are to the effect that appellant had contracted with respondent for a similar loan covering property on Tenth
Avenue, and that respondent had been delinquent in
carrying out the terms of the contract with reference to
that property, and tha.t therefore appellant "had· notified

1
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

plaintiff that it would not further advance on the first
loan and' that it was no longer interested in continuiwgr
·the second loan above described.''
Counsel's failure to discuss in his brief the ruling of
the court in striking this defense indicates that he has no
confidence in its validity. He does cover the matter by his
Assignment of Error No. 10, but he has evidently con...
eluded that the assignment is without merit.
Of course, the failure of respondent (if he did fail) to
comply with the contract with reference to the lOth Avenue property, could furnish no excuse f.or appellant's
breach of the contract to advance money on the 16th
East property.
As stated in 13 Corpus Juris 613 :
''One contract cannot be rescinded for breach of
another and independent contract.''
In Rock vs. Gaede (Kan.), 207 Pac. 323, it is said:
"The buyer has. no right to rescind or refuse to
perform a contract for the purchase of a quantity of
flour upon the ground that a shipment of the same
brand, made under a separate contract between the
same parties, had proved unfit for use.''
In Hanson vs. Parker-Wittenberg (Mass.), 91 N. E.
383, it is said :
''Where there were two independent contracts
between the same persons for the furnishing of certain goods. of the same .kind and quality, at different
times, the fact that the seller has committed a breach
of the first contract, by furnishing goods inferior to
those required by the contract, and by failing, upon
demand, to furnish goods of the kind and quality re-

8
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quired, does not justify the buyer in assuming that
the seller will also break his second contract for a
further supply of like goods, and, although the buyer
may be reasonably apprehensive of a like breach of
the second contract, he has no right to rescind or
repudiate the second contract before it has been
broken by the seller.''
There was absolutely no justification for appellant's
refusal to advance the ten per cent. Respondent had complied with every condition entitling him to the payment
of the money, and because of appellant's refusal to make
the payment respondent eould not pay his material and
labor bills and was obliged to cease work on the building.
(Ab. 28, Tr. 92.)
Now we come to the next step in the pToceedings. The
property was covered by the mortgage, so that it was impossible for respondent to secure any other loan. (Ab.
29, Tr. 98.) Respondent demanded in writing that the
mortgage be released, and this appellant refused to do,
unless respondent would pay the following items of expense, which it claimed to have incurred:
Federal Housing Administration appraisal
fee ··············-····-----------·------·-···············------·-·····-················-·················$ 10.00
Mortgagee appraisal fee and credit report......... 6.00
Initial service mortgagee........---··················-···-··················· 75.00
Recording fee ····-·········-······························-··················-················· 7.10
Abstracting.......................................................................................... 5.00
Fire Insurance ···-···-···············-····-·························-·······-·······-····· 21.00
Total. .......................................................................$124.10
Less credit which appellant appears to have
given respondent ··············-········································-·······-·· 10.00
Net amount claim ed.....................................................................$114.1 0

9
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That appellant offered t-o release the mortgage if respondent would pay the foregoing items is. set forth in paragraph 8 of appellant's counterclaim (Tr. 33), which paragraph, on plaintiff's motion, was stricken as constituting
no defense (Tr. 47), and appellant assigns the ruling of
the court as error. (Ass. Error No. 10.)
Counsel argues that appellant was under no obligation to execute the release until these items vvrere paid, and
especially the insurance item, which he say.s inured to the
benefit of the property owner. Respondent was to pay
these items in part consideration for the making of the
loan to him, and yet appellant takes the position that, even
th·ough appellant refused to make the loan as it agreed to
do, respondent ought, nevertheless, to pay the expenses.
This is an unusual brand of logic which we think the court
will not adopt. Why is. respondent under any obligation
to pay the expenses of securing the F.H.A. commitment,
when, after the comnritment was obtained, appellant
breached its. contract by refusal to pay over the money?
The charge for insurance is no more valid than any other
item. What use is the insurance to respondent when he
has no house, and is prevented by the lien which appellant
holds from securing means elsewhere with which to complete the house? To say that appellant can breach its
agreement to pay over the money, and yet require re·
spondent to pay the expense of appellant in arranging
for the money, seems to us preposterous. The court committed no error in striking paragraph 8 of the counterclaim.

10
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We now come to a consideration of the right of respondent to recover damages awarded by the judgment.
Sec. 78-3-8 Revised Statutes of Utah 1933, provides:
''If the mortgagee fails to discharge or release
any mortgage after the same ha.s. been fully satisfied,
he shall be liable to the mortgagor for double the
damages resulting from such failure. Or the mortgagor may bring an action against the mortgagee to
compel the discharge or releas.e of the mortgage after
the same ha.s been satisfied, and the judgment of the
court must be that the mortgagee discharge or release
the mortgage and pay the mortgagor the costs of suit
and all dam~ageS' resulting from su1ch faiflure. ''
In Kelley vs. Narregang (S.D.), 162 N. W. 386, it was
alleged in plaintiff's complaint that the plaintiff and his
wife executed to the defendant their note for $7000,
secured by a mortgage; that defendant caused said mortgage to be recorded, but defendant refused to pay over
or deliver to the plaintiff any money, whatsoever; that
thereafter plaintiff demanded a release of the mortgage;
that defendant refused to cause said mortgage to be satisfied of record, and that plaintiff was compelled to commence an action to have the same cancelled and was corp.pelled to employ an attorney and incurred large expense.
It was further alleged that at the trial of the case for the
cancellation of the mortgage the court entered judgment
that defendant execute a satisfaction of the mortgage;
that in prosecuting .such action plaintiff was compelled to
incur expenses and attorney's fees amounting to the sum
of $350. Upon demurrer to the complaint it was held
that it stated a cause of action.

11
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It will be noted that the case just referred to was prosecuted for the re-covery of the damages, after the cancellation suit had been concluded. An appeal from the
judgment in favor of the plaintiff was prosecuted (170
N. W. 131), and the judgment was sustained~ Says the
court:
''All points raised by appellant, save one, became
_res· adjud.icata; by the judgment of the court in a
former action brought by the present respondent
against the present appellant, to compel the cancellation of the mortgage. The only question before us
is whether the words 'all damages. which he or they
may sustain by reason of such refusal,' as found in
Sec. 2061, Civil Code, include the fees paid by respondent to his attorneys in the former action, and
respondent's personal expenses in conn-ection· with
the preparation and trial of that action.''
Continuing the court says:
''By the same token it would seem that if he were
liable for co.sts in that action, he would have be~n
liable for the counsel fees paid by the successful
party in that action, if claim had been made therefor.
In our opinion the situation is analygous. to that
arising in actions upon undertakings given in injunction proceedings, where it has~ been decided that
the injunction was improvidently granted. While in
that action the action is ex contractu and the damages measured ·by Sec. 2295, Civil Code, and in this
action the action is ·ex delicto and .the damage measured by Sec. 2312, Civil Code, yet, if counsel fees are
properly allowable in the one case, they certainly
are in the other. In each case the question is: Was
such claimed element of damage 'proximately caused
thereby~' "

12
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The court will observe that in the Kelley-Narregang
case the facts are almost identical with those in the case
at bar. A note and mortgage were executed and the mortgage recorded and no money ~vas advanced, and yet the
court held that the statute, 'vhich is very similar to our
Sec. 78-3-8, ap·plied. The South Dakota statute provided
that the plaintiff might recover ''damages which he or
they mo;y sustain by reason of such refu.sa.l," while our
statute provides that plaintiff may recover'' all damages
resulting from such failure.'' The only difference between the two cases is that the Kelley-Narregang case
was one to recover the damage in a separate suit after
the suit to compel cancellation of the mortgage had been
decided. But on the second appeal the South Dakota
court used this language :
''By the same token it w·ould seem if he were
liable for the costs in that action, he would also have
been liable for the counsel fee.s paid by the successful party in that action if a claim has been ma:d'e
therefor.''
In the case of McClure vs. Scates (Kan.), 67 Pac. 856,
the statute provided that in mandamus cases.:
''If judgment be given for plaintiff he shall recover damages which he shall have sustained, to he
ascertained by the court or jury or by referees as in
civil actions, and costs; and a peremptory writ of
mandate shall also be granted to him without delay."
The court held that ''damages" included attorney's
fees, and that they were recoverable in the same action
in which the writ of mandate was sought.

13
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Appellant relies upon the early case of Openshaw vs.
Haflin, 24 Utah 426, 68 Pac. 138 (and we might also refer
the court to the similar case of Brubaker vs. Bennett, 19
Utah 401, 57 Pac. 170), wherein this court held that a
statute which contained a .special provision for the recovery of ''costs of suit, incl!uding attoTney 's fees, and all
damages resulting .from such failure, etc.,'' was .held to
be unconstitutional, insofa.r as it provided for the recovery of attorney's fees, and appellant argues that under
this decision attorney '.s fees cannot be recovered. This
contention is untenable, because after these decisions were
rendered the statute upon which we rely was amended to
read:
"the judgment of the court must be that the mortgagee discharge or release the mortgage and pay the
mortgagor the costs of suit and all damages resulting from such failure. ''
Under this statute we are entitled to recover such damages. We do not ask for the recovery of attorney's fees
as such, which was objectionable under the old statute,
but the attorney's fee is simply an item of damages, just
as any other item of expenses would constitute damages.
That attorney's fees, as an element of damages, may
be recovered, we have only to call the court's attention to
the case of Colorado Development Company vs. Creer,
96 Utah 1, 80 Pac. (2) 914, wherein this court construed
Sec. 104-68-12 Revised Statutes of Utah 1933, relating to
actions for a writ of mandate. This statute contains the
provision:

14
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''If judgment is given for app•ellant he may recover the damages which he has sustained, as found
by the jury or as may be determined by the court.''
This court held that under this statute attorney's fees
incurred in an action for a writ of mandate may be recovered as damages, and uses this language :
''The case of State ex rei vs. Cocking, Mayor, 66
Mont. 169, 213 Pac. 594, and cases there cited, are
authority for the construction of the Montana Statute, which is practically identical with Revised Statutes 1933, Sec. 104-68-12, that in a mandamus proceeding the 'vord 'damages' includes the expense for
the services of an attorney to bring the proceeding.''
Other cases where attorney's fees are allowed as damages in mandamus cases are :
Columbia Knickerbocker Tr. Co. vs. Finney,
(Kan.) 144 Pac. 222;
Larabee Flour Mills Co. vs. Ry. Co., (Kan.) 116
Pac. 901.
There can be no good reason why if ''damages,'' including attorney's fees, is an item of expense in a mandamus proceeding, the word ''damages'' should not cover
attorney's fees as an item of expense in a suit to cancel a
mortgage. It is so held, not only in the Kelley-Narregang case, supra, but in Cornelius vs. United States Bldg.
& Loan Ass'n (Ida.), 292 Pac. 243; Vaught vs. Pettyjohn
Co. (Kan.), 178 Pac. 623.
Counsel cites authorities (among them Matheiu vs.
Boston (S.D.), 216 N. W. 361), that a mortgagee is not

15
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liable for da>mages .fo.r .refusal to release a mortgage when
it acts in good faith and on advice of counsel. The authorities cited by counsel cannot aid appellant in this case. It
~.ntered into .a definite, positive agreement to loan respondent $3000, subject, of eours.e, to securing the commitment frQ:rn F.H.A. .im;uring the loan. That commitment was obtained. In reliance upon the arrangement he
made with appellant, respondent proceeded with the work
and jncurred bills for material and labor. When the work
bad _progressed so as to require F.H.A. inspection, that
inspection was made and the work approved. Respondent a:p,plied for 10% of the loan and appellant refused to
pay over the money. Respondent is left with a lien on
his property, the house only .partially constructed, and
unable to secure money elsewhere because of the cloud
1;1pon the title. Under such circumstances, can it be said
that there is any good faith on the part of appellant in
;r:~fusing to keep its agreeme.nt~ It acted without the
slightest justification and, as we have heretofore pointed
out, its only reason for not paying the money was because it ~laimed to be dissatisfied with respondent's .condu.c.t with relation to the loan on the Tenth Avenue property.
Counsel complains of the allowance of $25.00 for damages to the building, by reason of its being left throughout the winter in an uncompleted condition. There is
evidence to justify far m.ore than that amount of damages, and the amount was that which was determined by
the jury, and the court adopted the jury's finding.

16
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We respectfully submit that the judgment should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

REX J. HANSON,
JE:SSE R. S. BUDGE,
Attorneys for Respondent.
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